EPISTEMOLOŠKI IZAZOVI / EPSITEMOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

WITTGENSTEIN O ZNANJU I IZVJESNOSTI / WITTGENSTEIN ON KNOWLEDGE AND CERTAINTY

Abstract

In this paper, I will consider Wittgenstein’s understanding of the concepts of knowledge and certainty and the need to differentiate these concepts in order to obtain a clearer picture about the nature and structure of human cognition. In his text On Certainty (Über Gewißheit), Wittgenstein analyses Moore’s characterization of the I Know attitude and points out to contradictions arising from his understanding of the previously stated. In this example, Wittgenstein shows that the question of the reliability of knowledge is incomprehensible without the question of the connection between linguistic and epistemic games which should always be contextually observed and articulated. Only in this way is it possible to overcome epistemological scepticism and relativism and open the question about the objectivity of knowledge. In this paper, I want to analyse the above stated assumptions that made Wittgenstein’s project the basis for a different understanding of epistemological topics.